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THE KGB'S STRUGGLE AGAINST THE UKRAINIAN SIXTIES IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE 1960S

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The purpose of the article is a comprehensive analysis of the forms, methods, and mechanisms of the KGB's struggle against the Ukrainian Sixties in the first half of the 1960s, with an explanation of the evolution of the intelligence, operational, and preventive activities of the special service and the preparation of the groundwork for further repressive actions. **The methodological basis** of the article was the principles of objectivity, historicism, comprehensiveness, continuity, as well as a complex of special-historical and general scientific methods. The work used methods of analysis and synthesis, retrospective, problem-chronological, and the method of comparison and comparison of information from various sources. **Results and conclusions.** In the first half of the 1960s, the KGB developed specific tactics against the sixties, which differed from practices against underground organizations: instead of mass arrests, agent-operational measures, prevention and ideological pressure dominated. Already in the late 1950s, the foundation of systemic control was laid – an extensive agent network, mass “preventive conversations”, recruitment attempts and interrogations testified to the early institutional reaction of the penal authorities to the activation of the cultural movement. In 1963–1964, pressure took on more pronounced forms: along with public ideological campaigns, agent operations were deployed; in particular, the case of the group development “88” was opened. The totality of the recorded measures indicates a transition from fragmentary supervision to systematic preparation of a large-scale repressive action, implemented as early as 1965. The intensification of preventive work in the mid-1960s indicates that the KGB sought not only to control, but also to intercept the semantic leadership among the Sixties. It is significant that even many hours of conversations and coercion to “repent” did not guarantee the cessation of the Sixties' activity, which led to the further radicalization of the actions of the special services. Active “study” of regional cells and an attempt to connect the Sixties with the OUN underground completed the formation of the narrative about the “heirs of the nationalists”, which became the basis for subsequent arrests. In the first half of the 1960s, an institutional, agentic, and propaganda infrastructure was created to combat the sixties, which determined the nature of the repressive policy of the middle and second half of the decade.

Keywords: *Ukrainian Sixties movement, Committee for State Security (KGB), political repressions, dissident movement, Soviet regime, preventive conversations, intelligence and operational work.*

БОРОТЬБА КДБ ПРОТИ УКРАЇНСЬКИХ ШІСТДЕСЯТНИКІВ У ПЕРШІЙ ПОЛОВИНІ 1960-Х РР.

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Метою статті є комплексний аналіз форм, методів і механізмів боротьби Комітету державної безпеки (КДБ) проти українських шістдесятників у першій половині 1960-х рр., із з'ясуванням еволюції агентурно-оперативної та профілактичної діяльності спецслужби й підготовки підґрунтя для подальших репресивних акцій. **Методологічною основою** статті виступили принципи об'єктивності, історизму, всебічності, наступності, а також комплекс спеціально-історичних і загальнонаукових методів. У роботі використано методи аналізу та синтезу, ретроспективний, проблемно-хронологічний, метод порівняння та зіставлення інформації з різних джерел. **Результати та висновки.** У першій половині 1960-х рр. КДБ виробив щодо шістдесятників специфічну тактику, що відрізнялася від практик проти підпільних організацій: замість масових арештів домінували агентурно-оперативні заходи, профілактика та ідеологічний тиск. Уже наприкінці 1950-х рр. було закладено основу системного



контролю – розгалужена агентурна мережа, масові «профілактичні бесіди», спроби вербування та допити засвідчили досить швидку реакцію каральних органів на активізацію культурного руху. У 1963–1964 рр. тиск набув виразніших форм: поряд із публічними ідеологічними кампаніями було розгорнуто агентурні операції, зокрема заведено справу групової розробки «88». Сукупність зафіксованих заходів свідчить про перехід від фрагментарного нагляду до системної підготовки масштабної репресивної акції, реалізованої вже 1965 р. Посилення профілактичної роботи у середині 1960-х рр. свідчить про те, що КДБ прагнув не тільки контролювати, а й перехопити смислове лідерство в середовищі шістдесятників. Показово, що навіть багатогодинні бесіди й примус до «каяття» не гарантували припинення активності шістдесятників, що зумовило подальшу радикалізацію дій спецслужби. Активне «вивчення» регіональних осередків і спроба пов'язати шістдесятників із оунівським підпіллям завершили формування нарративу про «спадкоємців націоналістів», який став підґрунтям для наступних арештів. У першій половині 1960-х рр. було створено інституційну, агентурну та пропагандистську інфраструктуру боротьби з шістдесятниками, що визначила характер репресивної політики середини і другої половини десятиліття.

Ключові слова: український шістдесятницький рух, Комітет державної безпеки (КДБ), політичні репресії, дисидентський рух, радянський режим, профілактичні бесіди, агентурно-оперативна робота.

1. Introduction

Problem statement. In the first half of the 1960s, a young generation of intellectuals formed in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (Ukrainian SSR), which went down in history as the Sixties. They were the bearers of new cultural and social orientations associated with the partial liberalization of the “thaw” period. Their activities included literature, art, science, human rights initiatives, and public speeches in defense of the Ukrainian language and culture. At the same time, the intensification of national and cultural life caused concern among the party and state leadership, which viewed these processes as a potential threat to the ideological monopoly. A special role in neutralizing and containing the Sixties movement was played by the Committee for State Security (KGB) under the Council of Ministers (CM) of the Ukrainian SSR, which carried out operational surveillance, preventive measures, intelligence development, and open repressive actions. However, despite the existence of individual studies, a comprehensive analysis of the mechanisms and forms of the KGB's struggle against the Sixties in the first half of the 1960s remains insufficiently systematized. This necessitates a rethinking of the aforementioned issues, taking into account new archival sources and modern methodological approaches.

The problem of the study lies in the need to clarify the relationship between the official ideological policy of the “thaw” period and the real practices of the state security agencies in relation to the Ukrainian creative and scientific intelligentsia. The study of this topic allows us to better understand the origins of the wave of repressions in the middle of the decade and the transformation of the Sixties movement into a dissident movement. Thus, the outlined topic is of great importance for understanding the nature of Soviet national policy and the mechanisms of the functioning of the repressive apparatus in conditions of limited liberalization.

Analysis of basic research. The general situation of the Ukrainian Sixties movement in the first half of the 1960s has been professionally analyzed in the works of modern researchers Heorhiy Kasianov (Kasianov, 2019), Oles Obertas (Obertas, 2010), Yaroslav Seko (Seko, 2011), and Radomyr Mokryk (Mokryk, 2023).

The activities of regional Sixties cells in Lviv were traced by Yaroslav Seko (Seko, 2015), and in Lutsk and Ivano-Frankivsk by Bohdan Paska (Paska, 2015; Paska, 2016). The peculiarities of the functioning of the KGB in the context of its repressive activities against the national movement in the Ukrainian SSR have been traced in the studies of Anatoly Rusnachenko (Rusnachenko, 1998: 35–40), Yuriy Zaitsev (Zaitsev, 2012–2013), and Oleh Bazhan (Bazhan, 2014). However, most of the available work by scholars is based on sources of dissident or party origin, with almost no involvement in the previously classified archives of the KGB.

The basis of the source base of the article was the materials of report notes, information and special messages of the leadership of the KGB under the CM of the Ukrainian SSR to the Central Committee (CC) of the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) from the Sectoral State Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine (SSA SSU). They included detailed reports on the ongoing repressive activities of an agent-operational, preventive and investigative-judicial nature against the Sixties. The scientific novelty of the study lies in revealing the role of the KGB in the processes of pressure by the Soviet regime on the Sixties, as well as in involving little-known documents from the archives of the special service into scientific circulation.

The purpose of the article is a comprehensive analysis of the forms, methods, and mechanisms of the KGB's struggle against the Ukrainian Sixties in the first half of the 1960s, with an explanation of the evolution of the intelligence, operational, and preventive activities of the special service and the preparation of the groundwork for further repressive actions.

2. The KGB and the Sixties at the turn of the 1950s and 1960s.

Analyzing the actions of the KGB in the 1960s and early 1970s against the Sixties environment, we can see a certain difference from the repressions against the structures of the underground movement – the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Union (URSS), the Ukrainian National Committee (UNK), the Ukrainian National Party (UNP), the Ukrainian National Front (UNF), etc. If they tried to use the harshest possible methods of punishment against the underground, very

long prison terms, and in some cases even executions, then during the first half of the 1960s, open judicial punitive measures were practically not applied against the Sixties. Repressive pressure essentially grew throughout the decade and reached its peak during the general pogrom of 1972–1973. However, the special service used agent-operational and preventive methods from the very beginning of the public activity of the new generation of creative intelligentsia. Particular attention was paid to individuals who sympathized with any signs of Ukrainian national identity.

Researcher R. Mokryk points to the turn of the 1950s and 1960s as the time when many of the sixties first crossed paths with the KGB in one way or another. The poet Vasyl Stus fell “on the hook” of the local KGB agencies in Stalino (now Donetsk) back in 1957, when he was summoned for interrogation several times after speaking in Ukrainian at the opening of the monument to Taras Shevchenko. As of 1959, in Kyiv, the special service’s intelligence development along the lines of “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists” included 49 people, supervised by 109 agents. In total, the special service had more than 1,100 agents at its disposal in Kyiv; 74 new agents were recruited in 1959. Preventive interviews were conducted with 160 people in the capital during the year. Literary critic Ivan Dzyuba recalled an unsuccessful attempt by the head of the KGB ideological department, Leonid Kallash, to recruit him as an agent in 1959 (Mokryk, 2023: 136–138). In the same year, 1959, a student at Kyiv University, a young poet Ivan Drach, was summoned for questioning by the KGB, who, during a political briefing, resorted to overly harsh criticism of the Stalinists. In the spring of 1960, literary critic Yevhen Sverstyuk first became acquainted with the KGB methods. He was tried several times to persuade the authorities to give the testimony they needed during interrogations in the case of his colleague Ivan Brovko, who was accused of “bourgeois nationalism” (Mokryk, 2023: 139–141). In 1958, student Oleksandr Martynenko was subjected to preventive measures (SSA SSU. F. 16. Spr. 944. Ark. 183), and the following year, philologist Bohdan Horyn (SSA SSU. F. 16. Spr. 944. Ark. 177).

In December 1959, the CC of the CPU adopted a resolution “On the Status and Measures to Strengthen the Work of the State Security Bodies of the Ukrainian SSR,” which obliged the special service to “intensify work to prevent, expose, and stop hostile actions by nationalist and other anti-Soviet elements on the territory of the republic.” Punitive bodies were oriented toward the wider use of preventive methods. In July 1962, the KGB of the CM of the USSR issued a secret order “On Strengthening the Fight of State Security Bodies against Hostile Manifestations of Anti-Soviet Elements.” Detective work was to be strengthened in higher and secondary specialized educational institutions, and the intelligentsia and youth became

the objects of special attention of the special service (Kasianov, 2019: 45–46).

3. Intensification of pressure on the sixties in 1963–1964.

The government’s pressure on the Sixties environment significantly intensified in 1963–1964. Its key milestones can be considered the campaign launched by the First Secretary of the CC of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Nikita Khrushchev to combat the so-called “formalists”, criticism of writers I. Drach, Mykola Vinhranovskyi and I. Dzyuba at a meeting of the active creative intelligentsia and ideological workers of Ukraine (April 1963), the destruction of the Shevchenko stained glass window prepared by a group of Ukrainian artists at Kyiv University (March 1964), and the coercion of I. Drach, Lina Kostenko, Vitaliy Korotych and Yevhen Hutalo to write a publication directed against Ukrainian emigration in the Soviet official press (May 1964) (Mokryk, 2023: 354).

The KGB’s intelligence and operational work gradually intensified. In 1963, one of the key Ukrainian poets of the 1960s, V. Korotych, was recruited as a KGB agent. He appears in the special service’s documentation as agent “Yanvarsky” (Ivanenko, 2024). Approximately, in 1964, as evidenced by subsequent special service reports, the first major secret case of group operational development under the code name “88” was opened against the Ukrainian Sixties. The materials of this case have not been preserved in the KGB archives, and there are no corresponding reports addressed to the Ukrainian party or state leadership. So far, we have only been able to find a few references to this case in later documents from the 1970s (usually memos addressed to the Kremlin center), which mention 1964 as the year of the beginning of operational actions within its framework (SSA SSU. F. 16. Spr. 1074. Ark. 99). Obviously, this case was directed against the Sixties environment, the legal wing of the Ukrainian national movement, and was eventually partially implemented in 1965 in the form of the first wave of arrests. Since there are no references to the “88” case in the materials of communication between the KGB of the Ukrainian SSR and the CC of the CPSU, it can be assumed that most of the instructions for its deployment came from Moscow itself. Probably, most of the measures of an agent-operational and preventive nature against the Sixties took place precisely within the framework of the “88” case.

Evidence of total surveillance of representatives of the Ukrainian creative intelligentsia can be considered an information message from the KGB leadership to the CC of the CPU dated October 28, 1964. Monitoring the situation after the so-called “palace coup” and the overthrow of N. Khrushchev, KGB officers recorded private conversations of Ivan Dzyuba, Taras Franko, Yuriy Nazarenko, Hryhoriy Donets, Mykyta

Shumylo, Maria Hayduchok, Mykola Hryn, in which they sharply criticized the Russification policy of the former party leader, “violations of Lenin’s national policy” in Ukraine. Some of them planned to write open letters to the new party leadership with a request to change the national policy in favor of Ukrainians (SSA SSU. F. 16. Spr. 940. Ark. 200–206). In November 1964, KGB agents recorded a private conversation with I. Dzyuba, during which he expressed the opinion that it was necessary to prepare a document with a scientific analysis of the national policy of the Soviet regime in Ukraine and to formulate proposals for correcting the errors that, in his opinion, had occurred (SSA SSU. F. 16. Spr. 940. Ark. 219–221). Exactly one year later, the literary critic managed to realize this idea in the form of writing a treatise “Internationalism or Russification?”

4. The struggle for the legacy of the poet Vasyl Symonenko

In the first months of 1965, the KGB was active in the struggle between the Sixties environment and the authorities for the literary heritage of the young poet V. Symonenko, who died of a serious illness in December 1963. He became a true symbol of the Sixties, and party functionaries sought to view him as an official poet who allegedly did not oppose the Soviet authorities (Kasianov, 2019: 38). On January 16, 1965, at an official evening dedicated to the 30th anniversary of the birth of V. Symonenko in the Republican House of Writers, I. Dzyuba addressed the audience with a speech. He insisted on the dominance of the poet’s work precisely by the national idea, which is connected with universal human values, and interpreted his poetry as a call for high civic activity in the context of the rise of national and political life (Obertas, 2010: 116). The penal authorities monitored the reaction of I. Dzyuba’s colleagues in the creative workshop to this event, noted the special position of certain representatives of the Ukrainian creative intelligentsia, who positively treated the literary critic’s speech as aimed at protecting Ukrainian culture, saw it as a manifestation of principle, honesty and courage. The KGB leadership reported to the Central Committee of the party about a wide discussion among writers of the possible expulsion of I. Dzyuba from the Writers’ Union of Ukraine (SPU) after his speech. Some colleagues planned to express solidarity with the critic, demonstratively declare their withdrawal from the SPU, write an appeal in his support, etc. (SSA SSU. F. 16. Spr. 941. Ark. 110–112). In the end, the leadership decided not to resort to sharp administrative pressure on I. Dzyuba for the time being.

A few months later, the KGB again brought up the “Symonenko Question”. On March 22, 1965, the leadership of the special service reported to party leaders about the widespread distribution among the creative intelligentsia and youth of the Ukrainian

SSR in a samizdat manner of unpublished poems by V. Symonenko, as well as his diary “Okraytsi Dumok” (“The Fringes of Thought”). The fact that these materials were distributed abroad and were published in the emigre magazine “Suchasnist” (No. 1 for 1965) caused particular alarm to the punitive authorities. KGB officers actively worked to clarify the circumstances of the transfer of V. Symonenko’s works abroad. Considering the popularization of the work of the poet I. Dzyuba, the head of the republican KGB Vitaly Nikitchenko expressed the idea of instructing the leadership of the SPU to hold a conversation with the critic, to inform the latter about the attempts of “foreign nationalist centers” to use certain works of V. Symonenko for propaganda purposes against the USSR, and to recommend that he speak out against these steps of the Ukrainian emigration (SSA SSU. F. 16. Spr. 941. Ark. 465–466).

According to the special services, the literary critic Ivan Svitlychny, who had the late poet’s archive, facilitated the dissemination of V. Symonenko’s unpublished legacy. The advice for the party leadership was as follows: “We consider it appropriate to consider the issue of transferring Symonenko’s archive for storage to the Writers’ Union of Ukraine” (SSA SSU. F. 16. Spr. 941. Ark. 467). The authorities’ reaction was to instruct the writer M. Nehoda to write an article with a critical assessment of the fact of the dissemination of Symonenko’s works in samizdat; eventually, on April 15, his libel “Everest of meanness” was published in the newspaper “Soviet Ukraine”, in which I. Svitlychny was criticized (Kasianov, 2019: 38).

5. Strengthening the preventive work of the special services

KGB officers took serious measures to prevent open acts of resistance by the Ukrainian intelligentsia of the Sixties against the national policy of the Soviet regime. At the end of April 1965, the special service received information that Vasyl Lobko, an engineer at the Kyiv Institute of Hydrology and Hydraulic Engineering, had developed and intended to disseminate in the capital of the Ukrainian SSR the program and charter of the “Society for Promoting the Spread of the Ukrainian Language (Ukrainization of Ukraine)”. On April 27, “in order to prevent provocation”, operatives conducted a preventive conversation with him at his workplace, as a result of which he was forced to voluntarily hand over the relevant documents to the special service (SSA SSU. F. 16. Spr. 942. Ark. 228–234). When in the village of In Sheshory, Kosiv district, Ivano-Frankivsk region, representatives of the Sixties movement Vyacheslav Chornovil, Tetyana Tsymbal, and Leonid Korenevych in August 1965 tried to take part in the opening of the monument to T. Shevchenko; KGB officers monitored them and “took measures to prevent possible provocations” (SSA SSU. F. 16. Spr. 943. Ark. 360–363).

In the first half of the 1960s, the KGB's preventive work against representatives of the Sixties was significantly intensified. In particular, in 1963, the author of samizdat texts, a resident of Kyiv, Yevheniya Kuznetsova, was subjected to preventive measures (SSA SSU. F. 16. Spr. 944. Ark. 198). During 1963–1964, special services officers actively studied the activities of Ivan Hel, a Lviv resident, who was a member of a group of “nationalistically inclined youth.” After he attempted to distribute samizdat materials at the Shevchenko celebrations in Kaniv in May 1964, he was invited to the KGB Department for the Lviv region for a preventive interview (SSA SSU. F. 16. Spr. 944. Ark. 196). In the same year, preventive measures were taken against the head of the Lviv creative youth club “Prolisok” (“Snowdrop”) Mykhailo Kosiv “for nationalistic manifestations” (SSA SSU. F. 16. Spr. 944, File 194).

In October 1964, the Sixties artist Opanas Zalyvakha was invited to the premises of the Ivano-Frankivsk regional KGB. A special service captain named Synytsia conducted preventive conversations with the artist, which lasted for five days (Zbirka poiasnen, 1964). His goal was to intimidate the dissident, force him to stop being interested in Ukrainian culture and national ideas, and to abandon ties with like-minded people. Under pressure from a special service officer, the artist voluntarily handed over to the KGB 14 items of “anti-Soviet” literature, letters from the Kyiv artist Alla Horska, journalist V. Chornovil, artist Denys Ivantsiv, as well as banknotes from the period of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917–1921, and a tape reel with recordings of Ukrainian songs. Among the published literature, in particular, were books by Dmytro Doroshenko “History of Ukraine” (Krakow – Lviv, 1942), Filaret Kolessa “Ukrainian People's Thoughts” (Lviv, 1920), Taras Shevchenko “Kobzar” with a dedication inscription by A. Horska “Glory to Ukraine! Glory forever!” (Zbirka poiasnen, 1964: 30–31).

Because of the conversations with the operative, O. Zalyvakha was forced to write a lengthy explanation on 31 pages. The artist provided detailed information about his own views on the policy of the Soviet authorities towards the Ukrainian people, reported on the reading and distribution of poems by young poets from the generation of the Sixties, and other samizdat literature. Under pressure from the KGB, the artist provided some information about his Kyiv, Lviv, and Ivano-Frankivsk acquaintances from the dissident community (Zbirka poiasnen, 1964). However, such careful preventive treatment of the artist was actually ineffective: in late 1964 – in the first half of 1965, O. Zalyvakha's oppositional public activity, his participation in the distribution of samizdat, even became somewhat more active.

Extremely serious and well-thought-out preventive work was carried out in April 1965 with the

Kyiv writer Borys Antonenko-Davydovych, a victim of Stalin's repressions, who had extensive connections and significant influence among the Sixties. On April 5, 12, and 16, the KGB of the Ukrainian SSR conducted three conversations with the writer, lasting a total of 15 hours. Two breaks were needed by the special services in order to study the writer's reaction to previous conversations and take this reaction into account in subsequent meetings. B. Antonenko-Davydovych was warned that if he continued to “incite certain individuals from among the creative youth to violate public order,” measures that are more stringent would be taken against him. Because of the preventive work, it was decided to continue surveillance of the writer (SSA SSU. F. 16. Spr. 942. Ark. 170–180).

At least since the beginning of 1965, the special services were actively preparing for more active and radical actions against the Ukrainian Sixties environment and the samizdat distribution network. The “study” of active participants of the movement was intensified, in particular, Kyiv residents Ivan Rusyn, Oleksandr Martynenko, Yaroslav Hevrych, Ye. Kuznetsova, Lviv residents Mykhailo Horyn, Bohdan Horyn, Mykhailo Osadchy, Myroslava Zvarychevska, M. Kosiv, I. Hel, Ternopil residents Ihor Hereta and Metodiy Chubatyy, Ivano-Frankivsk residents O. Zalyvakha and Mykhailo Ozernyy, Lutsk resident Dmytro Ivashchenko, and others. (SSA SSU. F. 16. Spr. 944. Ark. 176–200). In order to compromise the active dissidents finally in the eyes of the party leadership, they were apparently trying to present them as the heirs of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) underground. In particular, in the reports to the CC of the CPU dated January 7 and April 30, 1965, the Lviv Sixties were called “a group of nationalists trying to carry out anti-Soviet activities,” which were linked to the former organizational referent of the Horodotskyi district branch of the OUN, a “cadre Ukrainian nationalist” Stepan Buturyyn (SSA SSU. F. 16. Spr. 942. Ark. 239).

6. Conclusions

Thus, in the first half of the 1960s, the KGB developed specific tactics against the Sixties, which differed from practices against underground organizations. Instead of mass arrests, dominated agent-operational measures, prevention and ideological pressure. Already in the late 1950s, the foundation of systemic control was laid – an extensive agent network, mass “preventive conversations”, recruitment attempts (I. Dzyuba) and interrogations (I. Drach, Ye. Sverstyuk) demonstrated a fairly rapid reaction of the punitive bodies to the activation of the cultural movement. The resolution of the CC of the CPU in 1959 and the union order of 1962 provided a normative basis for this work, orienting the special service towards the intelligentsia and youth as an environment of potential “ideological sabotage”. In 1963–1964, the

pressure took on more pronounced forms: along with public ideological campaigns, intelligence operations were launched, in particular, the case of the group development “88” was opened, which was probably coordinated from the Union center. The totality of the recorded measures indicates a transition from fragmentary surveillance to systematic preparation of a large-scale repressive action, implemented already in 1965.

The struggle for the “Symonenko legacy” was a significant issue in the KGB’s activities against the Sixties. The intensification of preventive work in the mid-1960s indicates that the KGB sought not only to control but also to intercept the semantic leadership among the sixties. Monitoring of I. Dzyuba’s speech, attempts to isolate the archive of V. Symonenko, inspired public discrediting campaigns (libel against I. Svitlychny) demonstrated a combination of

operational and propaganda tools. At the same time, individualized prevention in the cases of V. Lobko, I. Hel, M. Kosiv, O. Zalyvakha, and B. Antonenko-Davydovych served the function of intimidation, gathering information, and building an evidence base for future accusations. It is significant that even hours-long conversations and coercion to “repent” did not guarantee the cessation of activity, which led to further radicalization of the actions of the special services. Active “study” of regional cells and an attempt to link the sixties with the OUN underground completed the formation of the narrative about the “heirs of the nationalists,” which became the ideological basis for subsequent arrests. Thus, in the first half of the 1960s, an institutional, agentic, and propaganda infrastructure for the fight against the sixties was created, which determined the nature of the repressive policy of the middle and second half of the decade.

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